David does a book review: 02
Thomas Jefferson and his founding of the University of Virginia in 1819 illustrates the importance the early shapers of America placed on education to the securing of a free society. For a deist like Jefferson, the educated class would spread the light of education to the masses and foster a spirit of democracy. Thus, individualism and scientific reason were core beliefs passed from one generation to another.
In Twilight of the American Enlightenment: The 1950s and the Crisis of Liberal Belief, George Marsden, Emeritus Professor of History at the University of Norte Dame, documents and describes the 1950s as the last moments of a fragile national consensus, finally collapsing under the cultural and moral turmoil of the 60s and 70s. By emphasizing the changes in religious life in the mid-twentieth century, corresponding to a shifting culture, Marsden provides a background for the religious right that offers a credible understanding of the “culture wars” in the contemporary environment.
Of the many windows to pass that offer a glimpse into the fragile state of American culture in the 1950’s, Marsden stops at mass media and the sudden advent of the television. “In 1947, most Americans had seen television only in store windows. By 1954, as many as 50 million people had watched some episodes of I Love Lucy.” Television was only the latest part of the trend of mass-media’s role in reshaping twentieth-century life. But unlike radio, film, and mass-marketed print, the “TV revolution” was having the effect of impacting the lives of almost everyone.
To show the importance of the issues related to television in the national conversation, Marsden brings to focus the reflections and analysis of mid-century voices. A review of the literature at the time is mostly negative and reveals a “worrying that television was contributing to erosion of the national character.” An assumption was that a well-functioning culture needed intellectual, literary, and artistic leadership, a basic tenet of liberal thought. Likewise, Hannah Arendt, a Jewish German immigrant and expert in totalitarianism wrote in 1959, “A society obsessed with consumption cannot at the same time be cultured or produce a culture.”
In the least, television played a significant role in building a consumer-driven culture that dictated how millions of Americans would spend their leisure time, what they would eat and drink, and how they would live their lives. The concern was that mass media was eroding the national character by fostering a people not shaped by traditional culture.
So, what kind of character was being formed in the emerging generation, and what ideals were being instilled? Marsden is able to point to two values that were passed on and were “among the most widely shared” cultural beliefs; they are that one “ought to be scientific,” and one “ought to be true to oneself.” They are traditional American attitudes, but they prove to be a fragile duo of core beliefs.
A tension between scientific authority and the autonomous individual is revealed in mid-century academics. In a chapter titled, “The Problem of Authority: The Two Masters,” Marsden illustrates the case with Alfred Kinsey and his 1948 volume, Sexual Behavior of the Human Male, and in 1953, Sexual Behavior of the Human Female. What is remarkable about the zoology professor at the University of Indiana is that he’s a “dispassionate scientific observer of the behavior of the human animal.” And what is entirely missing in the volumes is any moral consideration of what is deeply intimate and intrapersonal. With all the high praise of scientific reason, it is revealed as impotent and unable to provide any grounding for moral behavior or direction for a well-lived life.
Therefore, the individual is left to fend for himself. “The meaning of life, everyone seemed to agree, could be found not by looking to tradition or to community, either past or present, but rather, by looking within. This midcentury consensus recommended that people free themselves, often with the authority of modern science, from traditionalist moralities and mythologies. Individual development, individuality, and self-fulfillment should be preeminent goals.”
But in a culture dominated by commercialization and fed by mass media, which bred conformity, tension was heightened. In course, individual freedom was a dominant idea propagated into the minds of the emerging generation and led to the moral turmoil of the 60s and 70s.
In an age of individual autonomy and scientific authority, the nation was becoming even more secularized, but also “The United States was experiencing one of the most widespread religious revivals in its history.” If “autonomy,” meaning ‘a law to oneself,’ and “scientific authority” sound irreconcilable, adding “conformity” and “widespread religious revival” to the mix is enough to cause confusion.
Yes, they were confusing times. But to provide clarity to the cultural dynamic of mid-century America, Marsden uses two descriptive words to describe the religious life of this time: privatization and conformity. Privatization describes the “many religious people participating in a culture so detached from religious concerns.”
To many Americans, privatization of religious faith had become a necessity to fostering cooperation in a secular society, but in addition to privatization, religious life in mid-century America can be described by conformity. Marsden identifies “Individual development, individuality, and self-fulfillment” as preeminent goals, and conformity to these trends swept through the “revival of religious life.” Churchgoers “were likely to subordinate their professed traditional theological beliefs to the pervasive national creed.”
But what was the ”pervasive national creed?” It is pointed throughout the chapters that faith in self and in science were established dogmas. And as Marsden discusses, a national piety was intensified as last-ditch effort to preserve the tradition of founding principles. "Civil religion is a popular piety that treats the nation itself as an object of worship. It involves engaging in symbolic rituals, such as honoring the flag and observing national holidays, as well as hallowing the memories of great leaders,” exemplified in “One nation under God,” added to the pledge of allegiance and the national motto, “In God We Trust,” both adopted in the 50s.
After the moral collapse in the 60s and 70s, George Marsden’s argues that the religious-right emerged as a way to fill the moral void and restore a national consensus, that at one time gave Christianity a prominent seat at the table of public influence. As a result, the script is still being played out in the “culture wars “ of contemporary America.
Where do we go from here? Marsden offers a way forward referred to as “confessional pluralism,” a view borrowed from Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), a “leading modern thinker regarding religion and culture.” Trained as a Reformed pastor, he was a renowned defender of the orthodox Christian faith, a prolific writer, and leader in religious, academic, and political affairs, serving as Prime Minister of the Netherlands in 1901-1905.
Therefore, it is best to end by letting Marsden summarize Kuyper’s views on a pluralistic society and a properly functioning government: “The primary function of government is to promote justice and to act as a sort of referee, patrolling the boundaries among the spheres of society, protecting the sovereignty due within each sphere, adjudicating conflicts, and ensuring equal rights and equal protections for confessional groups, so far as that is possible.” Moreover, Marsden offers a thoughtful critique of contemporary issues that are well explained in the final chapters.
